Introduction

MARGARET GRUTER and PAUL BOHANNAN
This first Monterey Dunes conference is an integral part of what is
obviously a major thrust of both biology and behavioral science in the
last third of the twentieth century: a thorough examination of the
biological basis of behavior. We might well ask why such an obvious
area of study is, in many ways, so tardy an arrival.
Why did so many generations of scholars work so hard to create a
biology-free social science? There are, obviously, many reasons. At
least one of them grows out of the Western cultural premise that human
beings are "different" from animals-that we neither "descended"
(Darwin) nor "ascended" (Bronowski) from them. That premise is
manifest at many levels: linguistic, religious, and scientific. At the most
fundamental linguistic level, we find whole sets of words differentiating
the body parts of animals and humans. People have hands, but cats and
dogs have paws. The immediate response of speakers of Indo-European
languages to that point is that hands and paws are structurally quite
different. That is true-but not enough: for many, perhaps most,
languages do not make that distinction. In many African languages, for
example, the same word does for both. Indeed, it even does for "hoof."
The list could continue but that is not the point: the point is a more or
less out of awareness premise that people are so different from other
animals (and usually the word "other" does not appear when this kind of
statement is made) that you cannot even describe their body parts with
the same words. There are further linguistic dimensions to this Western
attitude toward animals: human beings, when they are at their worst,
"behave like animals" in accordance with "the law of the jungle." Thus,
we are likely to ascribe everything that we do not like about ourselvesour least admired traits-to "the animal in us." The implication is that we
ought to get over being animals. Therefore, at either a conscious level or
an out-of-awareness level, there is a built-in premise that an
achievement as admirable and as “human" as "law" surely does not have
any animal base—indeed, law is, in the popular view, one of the signs
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that we can transcend our animal beginnings! Except, of course,
"when man, with his monopoly on law:" behaves like an animal. "
Our plea is that, in examining the biological infrastructure of law,
we—even those who obviously do not harbor any of these
prejudices and will tell us that these phrases are "just idioms"—do
not allow ourselves to be tricked by the idioms, as we always are
when we fail to examine "
Premises about the differences between human beings and animals also
lie at the basis of religion. Many a child is confused by the idea that he
or she has a soul (although in some religions, in some perioids of time,
there was some doubt about women) and so do parents and siblings—
but the family dog does not. The dog was banished from heaven just for
being a dog. The dog is of a "lower" order and apparently it is the
presence of the soul that creates the higher order. Of course, in the
process of growing up, those very children soon become involved with
more important issues. They become enculturated and forget the doubts
they felt about the missing soul of the dog. And in the next generation,
they again tell children that dogs and cats do not have souls, but human
beings have.
Although we talked about it very little during the conference, many
participants realized that besides the intellectual interest of the subject
matter, we also had an emotional stake in this matter. In differing
degrees, we all had difficulties in reconsidering some of our cherished
values that seemed to be threatened by the new biological findings and
by the tremendous consequences that might arise from tomorrow's
discoveries. Reality and utopia—law and justice. How do we arrive at
the concept of justice? It was suggested several times that we could not
deal rationally with an idea like justice. It was repeated that nobody can
be completely free of all prejudice or preconceived ideas when it comes
to something so fraught with personal conviction as justice. Our point
here, however, is that early behavioral sciences-despite writings by
Darwin and others on the biology of behavior-seemed always to let such
hidden premises (not to say sensibilities) get in the way of their
thinking. We are still struggling with them today. Westerners
"instinctively" (and much of this kind of "instinct" is, of course,
cultural) read out the biological dimensions from the human behavior
they regard as most uniquely human. Natural scientists do it as much as
social scientists though the arguments used to cover up their premises
may differ. We have tried not to do that-probably without total success,
for premises lie very deep. In this context, we must add another
difficulty that Western

[xiii ]
children sometimes experience-ideas about the concept of justice. In the
United States, school children daily repeat the Pledge of Allegiance —it
contains the words "with liberty and justice for all." What does justice
mean in that context? We do not get much encouragement to ask that
question. Even some scientists and philosophers are adamant that justice
cannot be defined in scientific terms. As a result, the idea of justice, like
most other cultural ideals, is a little bit more circumscribed each time
we do not ask. Of course we cannot turn to science alone for definitions
of justice. Yet, every culture has some view of what is right or wrong, or
of fair play, even if it is not always put into words. So we can ask
whether there are proto-historical precursors to such ideas and concepts.
Also, whether it is possible for a society to function without some more
or less vague sense of justice, no matter, how perverted it may
sometimes become.
Two factors get in the way of understanding our subject: one is the
overzealous extension of the scientific kind of premise. Of course we
must not oversimplify and look for the genes of justice! But it is
important that we not exclude all of biology from our discussions when
we reject part of it. The other factor is more subtle: much of our
culture, like the grammar of our language, is out of awareness. The
premises behind the concepts of justice that our courts dispense are
usually not made overt. That does not make them the less powerful
levers on our thoughts.
We are convinced that, if we can get these points into the overt,
agenda, they will bother us little. But if we do not, then we are truly
beset by our unstated premises.
It will be apparent, as you read the following papers, that the idea of
pairing law and biology still seems daring. All contributors to this
volume have been careful—and a few have been skeptical even about
discussing the two in the same breath. Several of the papers warn us
in no uncertain terms. Markl asks why we should think law even has
a biological dimension. The social scientists are as stern, but make
different points: Schwartz warns us to be very careful in just how we
bring biology into law as it is practiced, and emphasizes that, in his
opinion, lawyers and judges must base their knowledge and decisions
not on science, but on the mores or standards of the community.
Adamson Hoebel urges us to recognize the limits of our own naivete.
Today, the underlying premises—particularly those of the scientific
community—are much more subtle than those of a few years ago.
Hence, in spite of the need for care we all felt, the biology of human
behavior is not as treacherous a topic as it once was. The intellectual
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climate of the present is kinder to an examination of this problem than,
that if only a very few years ago. However, such a statement must be
read in context: this introduction is being written during the time that the
"second Scopes trial" is going on in Arkansas. Obviously, there is still a
large segment of the population that denies any biological basis of all
human behavior.
Today's biology and social science are brought ever closer together not
just by their shared interest in behavior but also in trying to overcome
the popular denial of basic scientific facts. it is not just in Arkansas that
people today deny what the most eminent scientists of our time hold as
truth, where the state's attorney argues on behalf of those who believe
that there is a scientific basis to one and only one specific version-the
Judeo-Christian version-of the story of creation. It is not just in
Arkansas where some people close their eyes to the fact that human
beings are biological organisms, subject to biological commands as
much as to religious or cultural influences (these latter differing in
different parts of the world), and that the two must be understood as part
of a single coevolutionary process.
And what about policy? Have people in policy-making positions been
exposed to the biologically based findings of behavioral science- and
have they been exposed at an early enough age to build these findings
into their Weltbild?
The remainder of this introduction will deal with the following topics
that were discussed at the conference:
(1) a history of the relationship among law, biology and anthropology;
(2) the relationship between morality and law, and the evolution of
both;
(3) educating lawyers and fostering law-abiding behavior. .
LAW, BIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY
Adamson Hoebel's paper gives a sound.view of the relationship among
law, biology and anthropology. Here we add some complementary
points.
Law is just as subject to the premises about the sacred difference of
human beings from the "animals" as is everything else. Thus our
forebearers such as Maine and Ehrlich did not talk about the evolution
of "law" from early hominid behavior or even about the precursors of
law. It also assured that they did not even talk about the fact that human
beings, as legal creatures, were simultaneously biological
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creatures and that the two dimensions may have some things in
common.
It is true that anthropology has, for well over a century, been committed
to the proposition that the human organism evolved from "lower"
forms. But it is also true that early in this century, cultural -and social
anthropologists banished that idea into a special branch called "physical
anthropology." There specialists could study it separated from day-today cultural activities and nobody was bothered by any kind of
cognitive dissonance.
This is background for today's question: how do we link the human
biological system with the human cultural system? And, in this case,
especially human legal systems? Are there biological imperatives and
how are they to be linked with cultural commandments? Are the two
unrelated, for all that they often work against one another
Law evolved in one biological species, Homo sapiens, a highly
specialized animal. But what are its infracultural roots? Insects deal with
many comparable matters by "hard-wiring." But human beings deal with
them by a special evolutionary step: the introduction of culture, which
includes the capacity-indeed, the necessity-to choose and ultimately to
create both policy and the law that underlies and directs policy.

That proposition takes us instantly to the second point.
LAW AND MORALITY
Richard Alexander, Christopher Boehm and others at our conference
suggested that the evolutionary origins of morality lie in conflict
resolution-conflict management. Indeed, Boehm's idea-that human
ancestors had (to put it into lay terms} more talent for interfering in
dyadic conflict (thus turning it into triadic solutions} than they had for
mere submissive behavior-clears up many difficulties. Both types of
behavior, interfering and submissive, appear in today's non-human
primates. And of course humans too utilize submission in their power
plays—indeed, people like Ghandi thought we underutilize it. Thus if
we are careful not to turn it into too direct an analogy, it is easy to find
"proto-morality" among non-human primates, especially ~n their
characteristic ways of dealing with dominance and submission, and to a
lesser extent their capacity to interfere in disputes (usually on the side of
the weaker animal} in order to regain "peace." It seems to us, that it is
not going too far to suggest that some human ancestors (or
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some or all hominoids) had the very qualities we find in some of today's
primates.
Three points are essential here.
(1) The dominance-submission-reassurance sequence is the seedbed of
law and the idea of right and wrong.
(2) Submission-even weakness-brings its own kind of power. The
dominant animal is restricted in what he can do. Watch a humming bird
guarding his food source-it is a full time job. The non-possessing animal
(weaker for the moment) has immense advantages in mobility and choice
to further his personal gain and status. The submissive animal has more
options than the dominant animal.
(3) Primates appear to be better at interfering in conflicts within the
group and restoring peace by reassurance than are most other animals. In
many instances they seem to prefer this method to exclusive use of )
submissive behavior patterns. The desire for balance, harmony and peace
seems to motivate the dominant animal to reassure the weaker.
It seems that in the course of evolution, the triadic solution to dyadic
conflict has been the basis on which more flexible and therefore more
adaptive social systems could be built. Instead of the mere
dominant/submissive dyad, with reassurance, human beings have built a
primary set of institutions on a dominant/submissive/interferer triad,
whereby the reassurance part may be in danger of being lost. This kind of
interference—Boehm calls "the moral community" and' Malinowski
called the "social machinery"—would seem to have gained a central
cultural position.
It was also pointed out at the conference that conceptualization of the self
is involved in this matter, and it was suggested that there is a
development (ascent if you will) self-conceptualization / group morality /
definition of social gains / goals Thus, proto-morality seems to have
evolved into legal behavior and the concept of justice by the working of
two conjoined forces:
(1) the triadic form of interaction, complete with "interferer,"
(2) the growth of self-conceptualization, which involves the realization
that the other person is also a human and merits consideration and that
what we do to him may happen to us-as we have come to see in terms of
a concept of justice.
We can, as a result of positing those changes, see in evolutionary biology
what we once saw only in philosophy. Masters' paper deals - further with
the philosophy and shows something of the overlap. .
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Law itself, as we know it, builds on one other distinctly human capacity:
the capacity to state what the law is. Unless such statements of the law
are too divergent from actual behavior or desires, human beings would
seem usually to go along with them, then feel confident because they
know what "the law" is. Undoubtedly, some people know what the law is
and still want to break it, but it is nevertheless important to define the
boundary of behavior that is acceptable to the I group. Therefore, we
have man-made law. In short, specific laws .t work best when they are
overtly stated. However, their effectiveness is not limited to such
"statements." The statement itself allows a rule for behaving to be moved
from one social context to another-a phenomenon that (although, as
Schwartz suggests persuasively, it is not enough) is one of the most
remarkable aspects of human law.
However, we often experience a certain "disjunction" between mores
and the law-which implies that the legal institutions have ,: taken on a
life of their own and perhaps are inadequately connected with the other
institutions of human society, let alone with human biology.
THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES
Lawyers and judges, like doctors, have to make decisions on the basis of
inadequate information. Scientific information, including biology .might
well go into and even improve their judgments if it is used wisely-but
judges cannot know everything any more than the rest of us. So where
does one draw the line?
We know that law school curricula need simplifying, not complicating.
Therefore the problem remains: how do we introduce scientific
information (including biology and other behavioral science) as a
simplifying mechanism instead of a complicating one into the
professional training of lawyers and judges? Perhaps it can be done in
high school and college.
During the last 100 years we have paid a lot of attention to the health of
individuals-and have built our social expectations on medical progress.
When medical anthropology joined the effort by studying the links
between disease, medical practice, culture and biology, the result was an
even greater advantage of therapeutic possibilities based on new
technology and scientific findings. Could we make comparable advances
in law? Is not law related to human behavior as much as medicine is
related to physiology and biochemistry and (we are coming to
understand today) behavior?
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The emphasis of Western law has long been on the individual social
relationships have been largely reduced to individual rights. But today we
realize that part of being human means having sound relationships with at
least some other individuals. It is for these relationships, rather than
merely for individuals, that we need rules, structures and laws. How far
can we go medically and legally in treating human relationships as we
treat an organism? The social side of this organism should be helped and
sustained in the same way as the individual side. And this can only be
accomplished by the individuals whose Weltbild encompasses the
biological nature of man. Of course, the cultural context in which the
individual acts is also part of human behavior. Human ontogeny is
possible only in a cultural context.
Lawyers have indeed been "treating" individuals, even dyadic
relationships. But too often they do it without realizing that they are
treating only a small area of individual well-being, let alone social wellbeing. Individual rights and healthy relationships—these are the two
sides of a coin. To assure their well-being, you need the same basic
sciences—you cannot treat one without affecting the other. You cannot
have the accumulation of knowledge on the one hand and on the other
not allow anything new from the philosophical and scientific -including
behavioral scientific-arena to inform the legal procedure.
We need a broader horizon in legal education. The scholars and
scientists responsible for the professional training of future lawyers and
judges-these are the people who have to be concerned, so that \ training
for the legal profession is built on both a humanistic and scientific
platform. Then you can learn law as a craft in three years of law school.
Education for undergraduates (including those who plan to enter law
schools) and graduate school curricula must be based on he state of
knowledge and the state of the art. What we need are legal scholars who
will reach to the sciences for relevant data to further their own researchthe scientists cannot know what is needed to improve legal processes.

